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Abstract 
A hybrid standard macro model is supplemented by an explicit analysis of bank lending, 
based on a five-position aggregative balance sheet. In the model's two versions credit supply 
is based on a leverage targeting rule or on simple optimisation, taking into account lending 
risks and funding costs. Model simulations explore consequences of supply and demand dis-
turbances, discretionary interest rate moves, asset valuation and credit risk shocks. Besides 
standard Taylor policies, the paper compares the relative efficiency of additional stabilisation 
tools like external-funding taxes and anti-cyclical leverage regulation. Quantitative restric-
tions for bank activities seem to be useful.  
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1.  Introduction  
 
After the Subprime Crisis, it has become common saying that modern macro models show a 
severe deficit because financial markets are not analysed directly, and thus their (mal-) func-
tioning remains somewhat hidden in the background. It was cold comfort for modern New 
Keynesian macroeconomics that this complaint also applies to more traditional theories, start-
ing from IS-LM, comprising monetarism, New Classical and Real Business Cycle models. 
This lacuna is all the more awkward as the pattern of macroeconomic cycles seems to have 
changed. Boom and bust periods on asset markets appear to dominate, whereas the 'old' sce-
nario of rising output and prices on goods markets, followed by disinflation policies, seems to 
have vanished after the 1990s.  
 The 'new' image of macro cycles however is basically not new. It characterised large peri-
ods of the gold standard era where trend inflation did not exist and bank panics, preceded by 
heavy speculation on various investment fields, produced severe disturbances on goods mar-
kets.1 The decades after the Second World War were protected from financial instability due 
to regulative restraints, on the one hand, and increasing inflationary pressure on goods and la-
bour markets, on the other, that provoked, in a cyclical fashion, stabilisation policies. They 
aimed at disinflation, but at the same time they also might have choked off market forces that 
would have led to financial boom and bust later.  
 For the future the challenge is to design monetary policy strategies that likewise are apt to 
stabilise goods and financial markets, although in the latter case many experts, as e.g. Svens-
son (2012), recommend the primary use of macroprudential regulation. For the development 
of proper monetary policy tools obviously a macrotheoretic framework is needed. The task is 
not just an integration of the traditional bank lending channel in macroeconomic analysis. 
This approach was needed to cover borrowing of a class of private agents who for various 
reasons were excluded from the capital market. But as other bank asset items apart from 
credit supply played no essential role, and deposits were regarded as indispensable for bank 
funding, the central bank's direct or indirect control of reserves provided a reliable means of 
                                                 
1 "It is no coincidence that financial booms and busts of this kind were quite common during the 
gold standard, all the way up to the 1930s. This was the previous time in history in which a liberalised 
financial system coincided with a monetary regime that yielded a reasonable degree of price stability 
over longer horizon" (Borio 2012: 8n). However, due to the structural scarcity of bank reserves, 
imbedded in the principles of the gold standard, the mechanisms of financial crises at that time cannot 
easily be compared with the contemporary scenario.  
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overall banking activity (Bernanke/Blinder 1988).  
 Since the 1990s however, the banking 'industry' including various types of shadow banks 
has engaged in a large variety of financial assets, and increasingly has relied on the money 
market to attract additional funding. Thus the banking sector gained a new dimension of fi-
nancial flexibility. As a consequence, it tended to aggravate macroeconomic shocks that ema-
nated in non-financial sectors, but apart from this multiplier effect, the financial industry also 
produced disturbances with substantial spill-over to goods market. Many observers now share 
the "hypothesis that the financial intermediary sector, far from being passive, is instead the 
engine that drives the boom-bust cycle" (Adrian/Shin 2010: 602).  
The debate on a new concept of central bank behaviour is compounded by the analytical 
complexity of integrated macro-financial models. It took a quite lengthy and algebra-loaded 
paper to incorporate just the simple element of bilateral consumption credits into the canoni-
cal setup of intertemporal representative-agent optimisation of the New Keynesian macro 
model (Cúrdia/Woodford 2009), to say nothing of the computational effort necessary to bring 
together the market behaviour of agents from labour, goods and financial markets if every 
step ought to be derived from the famous 'First Principles' of micro foundation.2  
Nevertheless there do exist some papers that aim at a more compact treatment of the key 
relationships. Woodford (2010) presents an IS-LM-like graphical model where financial in-
termediaries operate on the credit market and earn an interest rate spread rewarding their two-
way services for final lenders (savers) and borrowers (investors). Intermediation is limited by 
capital and leverage of the financial industry, and the spread appears as a kind of tax that so-
ciety has to pay in order to make good the lack of a 'perfect' credit market with direct saver-
investor contracts. Consequently, for keeping these welfare losses low, "the model therefore 
suggests that changes in credit spreads should be an important indicator in setting the federal 
funds rate; the funds rate target should be lower than would otherwise be chosen, given other 
conditions, when credit spreads are larger" (Woodford 2010: 39).  
The credit interest rate spread is also a key variable in the partial analysis of the banking 
industry provided in many papers by Adrian and Shin. They emphasise that by changing 
short-term interest rates monetary policy executes a strong, inverse effect on the term struc-
ture. Lowering the policy rate thus increases expected profits of financial intermediaries. "The 
NIM [net interest margin] determines the profitability of bank lending and increases the pre-
sent value of bank income, thereby boosting the forward-looking measures of bank capital" 
                                                 
2 Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) give a first impression.  
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(Adrian/Shin 2010: 638). This argument helps to enrich the general picture of monetary pol-
icy transmission: if for some reason the spill-over from changes of the policy interest rate to 
the long-term capital market rate should be blocked, there is still an unidirectional effect 
working through the expected profitability of financial intermediation.  
Not least for teaching purposes, Benjamin Friedman (2013) suggests an extension of the 
simple three-equation New Keynesian macro model in two steps. First, goods demand is 
taken to be dependent on a long-term interest rate, which in turn is explained by an additional 
fourth equation. It captures the policy rate, its expected course in the future, and a variable 
risk factor driven by the relative amount of safe assets held in the system. The alternative of 
this reduced-form mark-up calculation of the long rate could be a setup of two additional 
equations capturing each side of the aggregate credit market where the central bank might in-
tervene, enabling quantitative and qualitative easing operations.  
 The model proposed in this paper takes up central topics from the contributions mentioned 
above. The aggregated banking sector is integrated in a simple hybrid macro model so that 
key balance sheet items are linked to goods market activities. Supply and demand equations 
are given without any microfoundations, but are compatible with the New Keynesian frame-
work. Contrary to Friedman (2013), the direct link from the central bank interest rate to goods 
demand is retained; bank lending thus appears as a second channel of the monetary transmis-
sion process. The key emphasis however is on the analysis of shocks that emanate within the 
private financial sector. Here, aiming to keep the analysis as simple as possible, no distinction 
is made between different branches although the presentation of important market mecha-
nisms might require a differentiated view on the banking industry. 
 Chapter 2 lays out the basic model and analyses shocks emanating from goods and finan-
cial markets. Apart from discretionary moves of interest rate policy a special focus is on addi-
tional tools of stabilisation strategies beyond the standard Taylor principle, like leverage pre-
scriptions, taxes on external funding etc. The comparison of simulation paths of the mac-
roeconomy after the occurrence of disturbances allows some tentative conclusions on the rela-
tive efficiency of alternative stabilisation tools. Banking activities follow a behavioural, 
somewhat mechanical rule that can be described as leverage targeting: shocks that affect main 
bank balance relations trigger adjustment moves apt to restore banks' indebtedness; via credit 
supply these balance sheet operations affect goods demand.  
A similar research program is pursued in Chapter 3 where instead of leverage targeting a 
simple optimisation calculus for deriving bank lending and funding is applied. Chapter 4 con-
cludes with an outlook on the use of quantitative restraints in the refinancing of the banking 
4 
sector: an old and new view on the role of money in the economy.  
 
2.  A Leverage Target Model 
2.1 Goods Market and the Banking Sector 
 
Consider a fairly standard hybrid macro model supplemented by an explicit bank lending 
channel. The goods market part of the model consists of a supply and a demand equation3, 
where expectations are only partly forward looking4, and adjustment and information costs 
cause an effect of last periods' variables on their current values. Both equations are comple-
mented by a Taylor rule, with the inflation target normalised to zero, and additional AR(1) 
demand and supply shocks, where tω  denotes white noise. The model equations are not writ-
ten in terms of deviations from the steady state, thus a constant autonomous demand term g  
is included in (3); potential output is normalised to zero.  
( ) 1 11 st t t t t tE yπ ππ θ π θ π α ε+ −= − + + +  (1) 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 11 L L dt y t t y t t t t t t t ty E y y g i E i Eθ θ β π β π ε+ − + += − + + − − − − +  (2) 
, , ,
1
s d s d s d
t ttεε θ ε ω−= +  (3) 
( ) ( )1 st t t t t ti r y A L BSγ π ϕ μ∗ ∗= + + + + + −  (4) 
Contrary to Friedman (2013), but similar to Cecchetti/Kohler (2012), the credit market inter-
est rate Lti  acts as an additional impact factor on goods demand. Thus the model takes into 
account that a fixed fraction of market agents depends on bank finance. The coefficients β  
and Lβ , respectively, thus each measure the interest rate elasticity of goods demand and the 
relative size of two groups of market agents: spending decisions of the first group depend on 
the short-term real interest rate, basically controlled by the central bank, and its implications 
for the whole interest rate channel of monetary transmission; and the second group's goods 
                                                 
3 Well-educated economists easily will find appropriate microfoundations that yield (1) and (2) as 
results of a standard optimisation calculus. In that case, output variations show the Representative 
Agent's response to exogenous shocks, but have not necessarily an implication for the emergence of 
involuntary unemployment. Of course, the equations also allow a more traditional interpretation; in so 
far, their algebraic logic is independent of the "stories we tell" (Colander 1995).  
4 The operator E indicates that a well defined part of the market population uses rational, i.e. model-
consistent expectations, taking into account that other agents rely on adaptive behaviour. The model 
was solved by applying the MSV solution following McCallum (2003). 
5 
demand responds to changes of the credit market rate of interest. Fixing β  and Lβ  implies a 
market segmentation that remains exogenous to the cyclical path of macro variables (indicat-
ing a drawback of these kind of models).  
 
Banks' Balance Sheet 
Assets tA  Capital tC
Lending stL  Deposits tD
 Bonds tB  
Table 1: Stylised banking sector 
 
The banking sector's balance sheet, with its items denoted in nominal values5, is given by Ta-
ble 1. The Taylor interest rate ti  in (4) may or may not respond ( 0μ ≥ ) to deviations of the 
volume of either balance sheet side from its equilibrium level BS∗  (to be explained below). 
Bank assets tA  are assumed to be illiquid in the short run. Their value reflects financial mar-
ket shocks ftε , which are also of the AR(1) type. They are mainly driven by random events, 
but also amplified by (fundamental) macro conditions measured by the path of output. The 
ensuing valuation gains and losses modify − for simplification reasons in full amount − the 
value of the banks' capital.6  
= + ft tA A ε  (5) 
= + ft tC C ε  (6) 
1
f f f
t t tt yεε θ ε ω σ−= + +  (7) 
Deposits, bearing no interest, are accepted passively on demand of the public, following its 
transaction needs which are represented by the output level.7 Credit supply is taken to be the 
banks' active market tool; but in the first model version banks are assumed to fully exploit the 
restraint given by a leverage prescription tλ .  
                                                 
5 In terms of formal dimensions, the model brings together logs of real magnitudes, percentage 
points and money values. Its equations can only be interpreted to show small deviations from equilib-
rium values.    
6 This of course depends on institutional and legal prescriptions that might differ across countries. 
The extreme parameterisation is chosen to show the macro impact of financial market shocks more 
clearly.  
7 The transaction demand argument would favour the inclusion of nominal income in (8), but the 
motive to avoid inflation losses on the part of deposit holders suggests the use of real income only. 
Switching between both alternatives has no bearing on the model's main results.   
6 
= +t tD D yκ  (8) 
s
t t t tA L Cλ+ =  (9) 
As a primary hypothesis, assume that banks will adjust their balance sheets after any valua-
tion shock so that a given value of leverage λ  is restored.8 As a second step, leverage might 
take the form of a variable norm imposed on the banks by a regulatory institution that aims to 
prevent the emergence of financial market bubbles by restricting the growth of balance 
sheets:9 
( )st t tA L BSλ λ δ ∗= − + −  (10) 
Linking stL  to tA  and tC , and having tD  determined by depositors, implies that financial 
market funding through selling short-term bonds tB  is endogenously determined via the bal-
ance sheet identity. In both cases, with regard to stL  and tB , banks are assumed to accept 
market prices, Lti  and ti  respectively, as given, and they are not confronted with quantity con-
straints.  
s
t t t t tB A L C D= + − −  (11) 
Bond financing is needed to fill a funding gap if deposits prove to be insufficient. Here this 
paper's model gradually deviates from the Adrian-Shin view. They assume the 'core' funding 
items (deposits) to be relatively sticky so that the growth of balance sheets is financed mainly 
through 'non-core' funding, which in small open economies to a large part reflects capital im-
port (Shin/Shin 2011). On the contrary, by linking deposits closely to the path of income, as 
in equation (8), and thus to credit supply, bond financing appear as a supplementary factor on-
ly.  
Bond sales tB  are meant to be net quantities as the model describes bank sector behaviour 
(interbank transactions are neglected). Accordingly the central bank is assumed to be the 
counterparty agent who adjusts base money supply endogenously to the banks' demand, by 
                                                 
8 For the relation between leverage and the banks' management of 'Value at Risk' see Adrian and 
Shin (2008). 
9 It might appear plausible to assume that balance sheet data are only available with a lag. But simi-
lar considerations can be raised with respect to output data, requiring the Taylor rule (4) to be modi-
fied accordingly. As these more practical questions concerning the technique of stabilisation are be-
yond the scope of the paper, the hypothesis of reacting to current period's values in (10) is maintained; 
the same argument applies to the μ  effect in equation (4) above.  
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standing ready for (short-term) open-market operations where bond prices are fixed to pre-
serve the central bank policy rate ti .10  
Empirically of course, much of the dynamics of financial markets in recent years is to be 
found in lender-borrower relations within the banking industry. Therefore Figure 1, which 
displays the interplay of deposit and external funding in US banking, corresponds nicely to 
the model simulations below, but underrates the active role of the shadow banking system, 
consisting of investment banks, broker-dealers of securities and hedge fonds. Within this 
lengthened chain of financial intermediation, deposits are not the main source of bank fi-
nance, but rather short-term credits from other financial agents.  
Seen as a whole, funding in the banking industry might be characterised, albeit somewhat 
loosely, as a system of 'bootstrap finance': every financial agent counts on the possibility to 
receive sufficient funds from other money market agents − an expectation that comes true in 
good times, but is shattered in times of distress.11 Therefore the central bank is urged to keep 
the money market liquid and to provide additional funds when imbalances between lending 
and borrowing occur. Thus the variable tB  in the model should be understood to show the 'tip 
of the iceberg' of market funding, an excess demand that is covered by accommodative mone-
tary policy.  
                                                 
10 Note that the items tD  and tB  (besides tC ) are needed to finance the asset balance sheet positions. 
Supply and demand of base money (used for cash holdings and minimum reserves) are not analysed as 
a further topic.  
11 "The fluctuations of credit in the context of secured lending expose the fallacy of the 'lump of 
liquidity' in the financial system. The language of 'liquidity' suggests a stock of available funding in 
the financial system which is redistributed as needed. However, when liquidity dries up, it disappears 
altogether rather than being reallocated elsewhere" (Adrian/Shin 2009: 603; cf. ECB 2007; Brunner-
meier 2009).  
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005  
Figure 1: Growth in deposits and borrowing of US commercial banks 
(Adrian/Shin 2006: 307) 
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Non-banks' credit demand depends negatively on the expected real lending rate and posi-
tively on the expected output level.  
( )1 1d Lt t t t t tL L E y i Eψ η π+ += + − −  (12) 
The positive sign of the expected-income effect on credit demand is compatible with the 
modern intertemporal-optimisation approach of a representative household who aims for con-
sumption smoothing over time; the sign of ψ  "reflects the greater willingness to borrow when 
expected future income is higher" (Friedman 2013: 18; cf. Cecchetti/Kohler 2012). Further 
ad-hoc explanations are conceivable: expected income might serve as a proxy for a positive 
collateral effect in the balance sheet channel of monetary transmission, or for profit expecta-
tions of investors.12  
By equating loan supply and demand, from (9) and (12), respectively, the credit market de-
termines the loan rate Lti . Obviously this should be interpreted as a long-term interest rate al-
though there is no assumption on the maturity of loans in the model.13 The equilibrium level 
of the loan rate is found by s dt tL L= , disregarding all shocks and using the goods market equi-
librium conditions 1( ) 0∗ ∗+= = =t t t ty E π π ; note that L , contrary to the other variables in the 
numerator of (13), does not indicate a steady-state value but a constant term in credit demand.  
( )Lt A L Ci λη∗ + −=  (13) 
The influence of the bank lending channel is also felt in the determination of the equilibrium 
real interest rate tr∗  in equation (4). The calculation of tr∗  serves to find that level of the Tay-
lor rate that guarantees goods market equilibrium, given a level of potential production. Solv-
ing the demand equation (2) for 1( ) 0∗ ∗+= = =t t t ty E π π  and then for ∗=ti r  (with 0=μ ) 
                                                 
12 More controversial is the effect of current income on credit demand. In the earlier literature, it is 
generally seen to be positive; e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1988: 435) hint to "transaction demand for 
credit, which might arise [...] from working capital or liquidity considerations". On the contrary, 
Woodford (2010: 28) argues that higher current output should "reduce the demand for loans, insofar as 
borrowers have more current income available out of which to finance current spending needs or op-
portunities". In this paper's model, as long as the impact effect is taken to be positive, there is little dif-
ference in the simulation results if current income is substituted by expected next-period's income in 
equation (12). This can be explained by the heavy dose of persistence in the model, which was chosen 
to capture empirical stylised facts.  
13 The interest rate spread between Lti  and the Taylor rate is particularly important in the second ver-
sion of this model below, but term structure relationships are neglected. 
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yields  
( )∗∗ = − L Ltgr iββ β  (14) 
Finally, by using (11), (12) and (13), the equilibrium balance sheet level is defined as  
( )LtBS A L i Cη λ∗∗ = + − =  (15) 
 
2.2 The Case of Demand and Supply Shocks 
 
In the following, two examples show the interaction of the model's variables. The Taylor rule 
is still standard, and the leverage ratio is fixed ( 0μ δ= = ).14 A goods demand shock yields a 
positive output response which is dampened over the following periods via the Taylor interest 
rate (Figure 2). This stabilisation effect is supported by the increase of the loan rate Lti ; it fol-
lows from the rise of loan demand that is connected to the rise of (expected) income. Note 
                                                 
14 Parameter values were chosen as follows: 3.5g = , 0.1α ϕ= = , 5A D= = , 0.7= =y εθ θ , 10λ = , 
8L = , 1Cβ κ= = = , 0.5L πγ β η ψ θ= = = = = , 0.02σ = . 
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Figure 2: Deviations from equilibrium after goods demand shock ( 0.1dε = ) 
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that loan supply nevertheless would basically remain unaffected because it is fixed by the lev-
erage prescription (9); the loan supply curve is vertical. However, changing macro conditions 
spill over to financial market sentiments according to (7). Thus there is a weak indirect valua-
tion effect upon tA , which − amplified by the leverage ratio − shifts the loan supply curve to 
the right.  
On the debit side of the banks' balance sheet deposits follow the temporary increase in in-
come so that less external finance is necessary; banks initially can reduce the amount of out-
standing bonds. This pattern of 'self-financing' through higher deposits supports the old post-
Keynesian view of "lending creates deposits" (Borio 2012) − whereas the old neoclassical 
view believed otherwise. The contribution of the banking system to the demand shock's stabi-
lisation is mixed: there is some additional lending, but a marked increase of the lending rate, 
which helps to dampen demand.  
In case of an inflation shock the standard Taylor policy reaction yields a temporary output 
loss, accompanied by a smaller stock of deposits (Figure 3). This loss of funding is only 
partly compensated by an increase of bond financing. The ability to tap external funds helps 
to avoid liquidity shortages. Nevertheless balance sheets shrink. This is mainly due to a lower 
volume of credit. The worsening of activity translates into a negative valuation shock so that 
loan supply is reduced. Loan demand decreases on account of expected lower output, but this 
is partly neutralised by the shock-driven expected inflation effect, which − depending on the 
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Figure 3: Deviations from equilibrium after supply shock ( 0.1sε = ) 
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strength of the inflation persistence parameter − lowers the real credit market interest rate. 
The net effect of both credit supply and credit demand shifts increases the nominal loan rate 
so that both interest rates work to bring down inflation.  
 
2.3 The Impact of Financial Market Shocks 
 
Now it is shown that valuation shocks on financial markets spill over to goods demand via a 
mechanical response of bank lending that follows a simple leverage targeting rule. This is 
demonstrated with reference to Figure 4 (which simplifies this paper's model by merging as-
sets and loans, on the one hand, and deposits and bonds, on the other). A rise in the value of 
the banks' assets is booked as additional equity, and thus creates − just by restoring the initial 
leverage ratio − scope for the purchase of new assets, funded by external finance.  
This behaviour of financial intermediaries leads to 'perverse' asset demand and supply 
functions as a positive market revaluation of an asset lets agents buy more, while a negative 
change of its market price forces additional ('fire') sales aiming to restore the target leverage 
ratio; the destabilising impact of this market mechanism is obvious. It was found that invest-
ment banks in particular even pursued a variable, procyclical leverage target so that their in-
debtedness grew in boom periods. In the downturn, attempts to deleverage cause asset prices 
to crash and preclude a recovery of investment (Adrian/Shin 2006; Leijonhufvud 2009).  
This paper's model modifies the above picture by distinguishing between two types of as-
sets and two types of funding sources. If bank capital allows expansion, the acquiring of fi-
nancial assets concentrates on lending to the non-bank sector. This of course is a special case 
 
Figure 4: Two-step balance sheet reaction to positive asset valuation shock  
(Adrian/Shin 2010: 611) 
12 
of a more general approach that helps to trace out the impact of financial market shocks for 
the activity on goods and labour markets. Contrary to the traditional 'broad' bank credit chan-
nel where borrowers' wealth positions limit credit demand via a collateral constraint (Ber-
nanke/Gertler 1995), the valuation effect creates additional 'free' capital on the part of lenders 
that motivates a credit supply shift. 
The simulation shows the dynamics in more detail (Figure 5). An improved asset valuation 
implies a bank capital appreciation and motivates an expansive credit supply shift, which is 
funded also by selling bonds. The loan rate falls and induces an equivalent increase of loan 
demand. The bank lending impulse lets goods demand rise which amplifies the ftε  shock and 
calls for a stabilisation response on the part of the central bank. The path of output and bank 
deposits is thus forced back to zero and below.15 Credit expansion is basically funded by de-
posits; but as Taylor policies succeed to dampen output, and thus deposits, whereas credit 
supply shrinks more slowly, relative strength of supply an demand forces on the credit market 
changes during the adjustment process. This can be seen in the non-monotonic path of the 
lending rate and of the amount of bonds that are sold in order to close the funding gap.  
A cursory look on the initial periods of output growth might provoke the appraisal that 
                                                 
15 Background simulations show that with flat supply curves and weaker Taylor coefficients (both ob-
servable in the 2000s) valuation shocks are able to produce extended boom and bust cycles.  
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Figure 5: Deviations from equilibrium after valuation shock ( 0.1fε = ) 
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Taylor interest rate policies are conducted on 'too easy' terms. This is a widely shared assess-
ment of US monetary policy in the mid 2000s. But Woodford (2010) rightly hints to the fact 
that borrowing costs for firms actually fell when the Fed's policy rate was already back to 
'normal' levels, obviously driven by credit supply shifts which in turn resulted from a persis-
tent change in the perception of macroeconomic risk.  
Tracing out the consequences of a single valuation shock, the model displays a similar 
course of events. The comparison of both interest rates reveals that the process of stabilisation 
is accompanied by a severe compression of the spread. Note however that monetary policy 
tightening has no impact on incentives and quantitative funding capabilities of credit supply.  
 
2.4 Stabilising Financial Market Shocks  
 
There are two obvious strategies of cushioning the impact of financial market volatility on 
goods markets variables. One is a modification of the Taylor rule so that the policy rate now 
also reacts (with an ad-hoc chosen parameter of 0.1μ = ) to a balance sheet gap: the deviation 
of the sum of assets and lending from the long-run equilibrium level BS∗ . The alternative is a 
version of activist macroprudential regulation: imposing a variable leverage on the banking 
business that likewise, in an anti-cyclical way, targets 'normal' balance sheets. In order to en-
able a comparison between both policy strategies, the strength of macroprudential balance 
sheet targeting has been set (with 0.286=δ ) so that output variances coincide; this outcome 
is taken as a benchmark that allows an evaluation of the other different results of both poli-
cies.  
Given the mechanical assumption of bank behaviour, an extended Taylor policy has no di-
rect impact on the financial sector as lending and funding do not depend on short-term interest 
rates. Therefore the spill-over runs via lower goods demand, which reacts to an initial in-
crease of the real interest rate, brought about by a lower path of inflation (Figure 6); note that 
the nominal Taylor rate remains lower than in the baseline shock case although the balance 
sheet gap in the Taylor equation (4) is positive throughout the adjustment process.  
According to (12), depressed output expectations reduce loan demand, produce an even 
larger excess supply on the credit market and thus a further lowering of the lending rate, com-
pared to the baseline case. With a vertical loan supply curve, there is hardly any dampening 
effect of the extended Taylor policy on the amount of credit, apart from the very weak reper-
cussion of output reduction on the time path of the valuation shock, according to (7). An in-
crease of external funding has to compensate the lower stock of deposits.  
14 
Thus the result of the extended Taylor policy is mixed: the path of output and inflation is 
less exposed to the consequences of valuation shocks in the financial sector, if the central 
bank not only responds to inflation and output gaps. But balance sheet growth is not tamed, 
the initial widening of the excess supply gap on the loan market keeps the credit market rate 
of interest low (and this might drive asset values further in case of a − not modelled − capi-
talisation effect on tA ).  
The inefficiency of this policy strategy is well understood: a countervailing mechanism 
should be established 'in the neighbourhood' of potential disturbances, if possible on the same 
level and at the same location of the market process. Therefore a policy of imposing a vari-
able leverage ratio promises better results. From (5), (6), (9), (10) and (15) lending supply fol-
lows  
( )
( ) 1
1 fs
t t
f
t
C
L A
C
λ δ ε
δ ε −
+= − −
+ +
 (16) 
This reveals that with a sufficiently large basic leverage ratio λ  a positive valuation shock 
produces an expansive shift of credit supply; but this effect is dampened unambiguously with 
0δ > . The simulation (Figure 6) shows that lending responds in a weaker fashion compared 
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Figure 6: Baseline valuation shock (thin line) and two stabilisation policies compared:  
extended Taylor rule (bold line) or leverage regulation (dotted line) 
15 
to the baseline shock scenario. As a consequence, the decrease of the lending rate − nominal 
and real − is smaller. Accordingly, goods market variables, output and inflation, appear to be 
more stable; the calculated simulation variance however shows that the volatility of output 
and inflation roughly remains unchanged (Table 2). But the general impression from looking 
at all variances is that macroprudential anti-cyclical leverage regulation has a clear advantage 
compared to an extended Taylor rule.  
Inspection of the macro process with a series of (positive and negative) valuation shocks, 
stabilised by leverage control, gives further insights into the linkages between financial and 
goods markets (Figure 7): 
• A series of small bad shocks (e.g. periods 25 to 35) may add up to a catastrophic output 
crisis, driven by severe contraction of bank lending and a marked increase of the loan rate. 
Particularly in this case, but also in general, a stabilising feature of the variable leverage 
ratio is revealed.16 Nevertheless, additional simulation shows that equity can be wiped out 
also in the regime of leverage regulation. 
• The interest rate spread Lt ti i−  shows a pronounced anti-cyclical pattern. Output is driven 
by credit supply (there is a correlation of .91) and the induced lowering of the loan rate 
whereas the Taylor rate attempts to stabilise output. Thus both interest rates work against 
each other. Also external funding fluctuates with goods demand (correlation of .63).  
• A related observation is that bank lending obviously is not driven by bank profits (in the 
                                                 
16 A drawback of the model is the neglect of the zero lower bound of interest rates which of course 
would influence simulation dynamics particularly in large-shock periods.   
 variance 
 standard  
stabilisation 
0μ δ= =  
extended  
Taylor rule 
0.1, 0μ δ= =  
leverage  
regulation 
0, 0.286= =μ δ  
A 0.32   0.29  0.29 
B 7.65   9.23   4.13 
LS 26.29   23.67  14.40 
iL 2.26    4.75  1.38  
i 21.44   14.98  11.30  
y 8.54   4.70   4.70 
π 8.62 4.57 4.54 
iR 4.01 3.58 2.13 
iLR 17. 94 17.25 9.62 
Table 2: Simulation variance of endogenous variables  
in case of a valuation shock with different policy strategies 
16 
literature roughly captured by the interest spread). Hence, the leverage targeting behaviour 
cannot simply be taken as a short-cut of a comprehensive optimisation approach of bank-
ing behaviour.  
 
2.5 Discretionary Interest Rate Moves 
 
Before proceeding to a simple model of optimal bank behaviour, we explore the consequences 
of discretionary interest-rate policy shocks of the type  
1−= +i i it i t tε θ ε ω  (17) 
where itε  is added to the Taylor rule equation (4) and tω  indicates white noise. At the same 
time, all specific stabilisation features are deactivated ( 0μ δ= = ). Assume that the central 
bank wishes to stimulate the economy; then the initial disturbance is a lowering of the Taylor 
rate, boosting goods demand. After some periods, the rule-based stabilisation feature of Tay-
lor policy gains momentum and brings the macroeconomy back to equilibrium (Figure 8).17  
                                                 
17 In order to capture the short-term character of this autonomous change of interest rate policy, per-
sistence has been set at a low level with 0.1=iθ . The visual separation of discretionary and stabilising 
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Figure 7: Simulated process with repeated valuation shocks under leverage regulation 
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During the initial expansionary periods two channels affect the credit market. On the one 
hand, credit demand increases on account of the income effect in equation (12); on the other, 
positive output experience also modifies asset valuation according to (7). The ensuing varia-
tion of leverage translates into a rightward shift of credit supply. The rise in the volume of 
lending is accompanied (under the given parameter set) by an increase of the lending rate and 
the interest rate spread. Taking into account that this latter effect improves the banks' profit-
ability (although this is not captured in the above model) the simulation shows that the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy also drives an amplifying effect by activating the 
bank lending channel. Falling policy rates cause banks to increase their holdings of risky 
(loan) assets through active balance sheet management (Adrian/Shin 2009). 
 
3.  Implementing Lending Risk and Funding Costs 
3.1 The Stabilisation of Credit Market Shocks 
 
In the following, banks no longer apply a mechanical leverage targeting rule with respect to 
credit supply as in (9), but take into account profitability with regard to lending and funding. 
                                                                                                                                                        
features of central bank behaviour is emphasised by neglecting the response to the output gap ( 0=ϕ ) 
and by assuming a lagged reaction to inflation in the Taylor rule.  
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Figure 8: Deviations from equilibrium after negative interest rate shock ( 0.5=iε ) 
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Banks' risk-adjusted profits tQ  are determined by the lending rate Lti , corrected by an esti-
mated risk premium tρ , and funding costs that ensue from selling bonds, i.e. the short-term 
interest rate plus a possible add-on tax rate τ , to be explained below (keep in mind that de-
posits do not yield interest). 
( ) ( )L st t t t t tQ i L i Bρ τ= − − + ⋅⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (18) 
The constraint is given by the balance sheet identity (11). Optimisation creates a simple inter-
est rule for the lending rate whereas banks behave as price takers in the funding market: 
( )Lt t ti iρ τ= + + ⋅  (19) 
This first order condition implies that − in contrast to the first model − the credit supply 
curve now is flat, and the amount of lending is determined by credit demand ( s dt tL L= ). As 
tA , tC  and tD  are given, tB  then follows endogenously from the balance sheet identity. 
Valuation shocks have no impact on credit supply and therefore are neglected. Because tA  
and tC  stay invariant balance sheets as a whole fluctuate less compared to the first model sce-
nario. As a consequence, with smaller funding gaps, also the quantitative importance and the 
volatility of bond financing is now lower.  
 The risk premium follows an AR(1) process (with tω  indicating white noise) around a 
given basic value ρ 18, but is also (inversely) influenced by the output gap; a cyclical im-
provement of macro conditions translates into lower credit risk.  
( ) 11t t t tyρ ρρ θ ρ θ ρ ω σ−= − + + −  (20) 
The equilibrium lending rate, now given by (19) with tρ ρ=  and 0τ = , again constitutes a 
part of the Taylor real equilibrium interest rate so that equation (14) applies.  
 Figure 9 shows the effects of a credit risk shock; to allow a better comparison with the 
valuation shock in the first model above, the simulation starts with an exogenous lowering of 
the risk premium. At first, there is no stabilisation beyond the simple Taylor rule.19 An initial 
                                                 
18 It can also be interpreted as a kind of monopolistic mark-up on funding costs, representing fixed 
costs of intermediation services.  
19 Thus we have 0τ = , and 0μ =  in equation (4). Deviating from the former assumptions (see foot-
note 14) now 4.5A = , 7L =  and 0.5σ = . A new setting is 1=ρ . In the leverage targeting model, the 
valuation shock was multiplied in its impact by the leverage ratio. In order to attain similar effects 
here, and to improve the visual exposition of simulation paths, the dimension of the risk premium 
shock has been enlarged.  
19 
lowering of credit risk assessment decreases the lending rate and thus drives credit and goods 
demand; the latter reinforces the decline of the risk premium. On the other hand the Taylor in-
terest rate increases, which directly stabilises the demand shock; there is also an indirect ef-
fect as the rising Taylor rate is transmitted into the lending rate. Higher output allows easy 
funding via increased attraction of deposits; banks demand some additional external funds ini-
tially, and larger volumes later when income-dependent deposits shrink.  
Leverage is increased by the risk shock, and returns to its baseline value during the ad-
justment process. This is a typical finding in the cyclical behaviour of the banking sector 
(Figure 10). It is reproduced in the model simulation (Figure 11) where lending represents 
the active part of total assets. A series of small risk shocks that are accentuated by feedback 
mechanism of output changes may well lead to a severe recession where bank variables, 
credit supply and the lending rate, act procyclically. Leverage now shrinks in the crisis, in 
contrast to scenario of the first model (Figure 7), where the monetary authority pursued a sta-
bilising leverage targeting strategy that allowed higher bank indebtedness, which in turn 
helped to dampen the macro downturn.  
An obvious regulatory intervention would be a prohibition to exceed some given leverage 
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Figure 9: Deviations from equilibrium after negative credit risk shock ( 1=ρ ) 
 with simple Taylor rule (thin line), extended Taylor rule (bold line) or funding tax (dotted line) 
20 
ratio, but there is no price-theoretic lever to implement this restraint in the model's bank be-
haviour. Instead, monetary policy might resort to the extended Taylor rule and respond to a 
balance sheet gap.  
An alternative policy approach is to impose additional costs on external funding. In a com-
petitive financial market, we might observe rising funding costs for individual banks anyhow; 
the assumption, made in the above calculus, of unlimited funding at the money market interest 
rate is hardly realistic. The rise of external funding costs in general will reflect interbank 
 
Figure 10: Cyclical components of total assets and leverage in US-chartered commercial banks,  
shaded areas indicate recession periods (Nuño/Thomas 2013: 33) 
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Figure 11: Simulated process of repeated risk shocks with standard Taylor stabilisation 
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lenders' risk which in turn might be captured by borrower banks' leverage. In the simple 
model at hand this market risk premium is substituted by a tax mark-up, imposed by a mone-
tary or fiscal authority where excess balance sheets are taken as the basis of the tax rate: thus 
we have ( )∗+ −st tA L BSτ .20  
Both specific stabilisation strategies, the extended Taylor rule and the funding tax, are also 
shown in Figure 9. As in the leverage target model, output variance is chosen as the bench-
mark to assess relative efficiency of both strategies; this made the setting of 0.75τ =  endoge-
nous given the arbitrary choice of 0.2μ = . Figure 9 and Table 3 reveal that both strategies 
deliver better results compared with the simple Taylor rule. Nevertheless, as in the leverage 
target model, the stabilisation approach that is located 'closer' to the banking sector, i.e. the 
funding tax, yields superior results: the volatility of all variables beyond output is smaller. 
This might come as a surprise as both the Taylor extension 0>μ  and the tax add-on 0>τ  
drive the credit market interest rate in (19). But the former also has a direct impact on goods 
demand which might cause a tension between the two goals of goods and financial market 
stabilisation. On the other hand, the tax add-on exclusively works to counter the lending rate 
decrease brought about by the lowering of the risk premium.  
 
3.2 An Easy-Money Policy 
 
A final question is in what respect monetary policy shocks in a regime of optimal bank behav-
iour differ from the leverage targeting regime. All specific stabilisation devices are deacti-
                                                 
20 For a more thorough discussion of liquidity regulation when short-term funding enables credit 
growth but generates negative systemic risk externalities see Shin and Shin (2011) and Perotti and 
Suarez (2011).  
 variance 
 standard  
stabilisation 
0= =μ τ  
extended  
Taylor rule 
0.2, 0μ τ= =  
funding  
tax 
0, 0.75μ τ= =  
B 0.25   0.16 0.08 
LD 3.18   1.31  0.84 
iL 1.04    0.90  0.26 
i 4.99   2.02  1.49 
y 3.14   0.80   0.80  
Table 3: Simulation variance of endogenous variables  
in case of a risk shock with different policy strategies 
22 
vated again; the central bank starts a short-term expansionary initiative before its behaviour is 
more and more dominated by the standard Taylor rule (Figure 12).21 Increased output figures, 
which helped to improve asset valuation in the leverage targeting regime, now lower the as-
sessment of credit risk. In the first case the restoration of leverage resulted in a credit supply 
shift that initially was exceeded by an income-driven increase of credit demand so that the 
lending rate was raised22 to clear the market. Now, with banks choosing an optimal lending 
rate, lower funding rates and risk premia let the credit market interest rate decrease, and the 
volume of lending adjusts to higher credit demand.  
The model again confirms that the direct effect of monetary easing on goods demand is 
amplified by a financial market response where now credit risk assessment plays a key role. 
Besides, a similar picture emerges in the case of demand shocks emanating in the 'real' sector 
(no graph shown). Credit supply now follows more flexibly credit demand, compared to the 
leverage targeting scenario (Figure 2), and the increase in the lending rate brought about by 
the rising Taylor rate is cushioned by the lower risk premium. Higher leverage signals an am-
                                                 
21 For technical details of this case see footnote 17.  
22 Note that the sign of the lending rate response depends on the model's parameters. 
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Figure 12: Deviations from equilibrium after negative interest rate shock ( 0.5=iε ) 
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plifying effect of bank behaviour.  
 
4.  Conclusions: a Note on the Elasticity of the Financial System 
 
The topic of this paper has been the question of optimal stabilisation policies with some em-
phasis given to the final goal of maintaining goods market equilibrium. Preventing, and heal-
ing, financial boom and bust cycles as such are not an issue. But the model in its two versions 
elucidates that portfolio decisions in the banking industry can amplify disturbances that 
emerge in the field of good and labour markets, or result from a monetary policy impulse. 
More important, shocks from within the financial sector, like changing market sentiments of 
the value of financial assets, are shown to produce a substantial spill-over to goods demand. A 
typical pattern is that positive financial market shocks encourage a credit supply shift, which 
by lowering the lending rate strengthens investment spending.  
In principle all disturbances rooted in this new dimension of the bank lending channel in 
macroeconomics can be dampened by relying on the standard Taylor rule. However, the ex-
plicit analysis of bank behaviour suggests to employ additional tools that have a more direct 
bearing on the banks' contribution to market disequilibria. A simple advice would be to in-
crease the Taylor rate whenever the volume of bank balance sheets (or the path of single 
items) grow too fast. But this was proven to be less efficient as this might pose a conflict be-
tween goods market and financial market stabilisation. The latter, in the framework of this 
paper's model, was interpreted as the goal to contain the growth of banks' balance sheets. By 
using this criterion, imposing a leverage restriction or an external-funding tax on the banking 
business appeared more useful.23  
Interbank relations were excluded from this study, but they constitute a major factor of fi-
nancial market mechanisms. Thus the funding tax substitutes a mark-up on interbank lending 
rates in a 'perfect' market where creditors account for their lending risk that can be derived 
from 'excess' bank balances. The multiplier function of the bank sector depends on the elastic-
ity of the financial system, i.e. on the ability of the banks to draw funds from the private sec-
                                                 
23 "The real issue [...] should not be one of controlling the possible mis-pricing of assets in the mar-
ketplace − where the central bank has good reason to doubt whether its judgments should be more re-
liable than those of market participants − but rather, one of seeking to deter extreme levels of leverage 
and of maturity transformation in the financial sector. [...] Even modest changes in short-term rates can 
have a significant effect on firms' incentives to seek high degrees of leverage or excessively short-term 
sources of funding" (Woodford 2012: 5).  
24 
tor and the central bank. It is an advantage that banks at times can reduce the amount of bonds 
outstanding, and that their financial needs in other periods are smoothly satisfied by addi-
tional funds drawn from the central bank. Bond sales tB  stand ready to fill any lacuna that is 
left if deposits should prove insufficient.  
At earlier times, losses of banks' reserves could not easily be replenished, but nowadays 
the high elasticity of the financial system by some observers is held to be the key explanation 
of the widespread volatility and instability of financial markets, the major root of macroeco-
nomic troubles of the 2000s (Borio/Disyatat 2011). The key point is the perfect endogeneity 
of central bank money, which has become a guiding principle of monetary policy after the 
new macro theories, focused on the importance of interest rates, gained acceptance. Keeping 
money market rates as close as possible to 'optimally' calculated policy rates became the new 
criterion for 'good' central bank practice. Frictions in base money supply would create interest 
rate spreads that hamper efficient goods demand control.  
This progress in monetary policy making came at a cost. Commercial banks progressively 
reduced liquid asset holdings, and were led to engage in any investment as long as spreads 
were estimated to be positive; 'capacity constraints' in the financial industry seemed to be re-
moved.24 Thus the suggested policy response, leverage regulation, should be understood as a 
hint to the former strategy of monetary targeting. Of course, Woodford (2010) is right to ar-
gue that the new topic of financial intermediation and its macroeconomic impact once again 
has demonstrated the limits of money supply and money multiplier concepts; liabilities of just 
the most active agents of the financial industry in no way count as money.  
But the rationale of monetary targeting always has been the establishment of quantitative 
restraints in the financial sector, and the repeated modifications and redefinitions of monetary 
aggregates show the attempts of monetary policy makers to keep pace with market innova-
tions. Leverage control therefore stands for the acknowledgement that bank assets, and credit 
supply in particular, can no longer be captured by the path of liquid deposits as a proxy 
(Schularick/Taylor 2010). The distinction between deposits and other liabilities has been 
blurred, not least because the criterion of the immediate means-of-payment function for defin-
ing a monetary aggregate was downgraded in the first place when the case was made for pro-
                                                 
24 "After quantity controls [of base money] were dismantled, the major central banks were left with a 
single policy tool: the ability to change the short-term policy rate. They lost control over the supply of 
bank credit and, over time, their influence over the demand for credit also weakened. [...] The build-up 
in banks' leverage was a direct result of the removal of quantity controls" (D'Arista/Griffith-Jones 
2010: 134).  
25 
ceeding from M1 to M3.  
Financial market instability and its repercussions on the goods market can thus be inter-
preted as an unwelcome by-product of former 'modernisation' of monetary policy strategies, 
and the need for new instruments may in part reflect the abandonment of 'old' restraints in the 
field of banking. However, the cyclical resurgence of old problems in new clothes is not 
atypical for economic theory and policy.  
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